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Abstract The role of competitive markets as ecient aggregators of decentralized information
is a fundamental problem in economic theory. This paper studies the informational eciency of
a market with a single traded asset, in which agents expectation formation about future price
has two kinds of deviations from rationality. First, traders have adaptive expectations, i.e. they
give more importance to the past price than a rational agent. Second, the agents are subject to
the conrmatory bias, i.e. they tend to discard new information that substantially diers from
their priors. Taken separately, each deviation worsens the informational eciency of the market;
however, for some ranges of parameters, when the two biases are combined, they tend to mitigate
each others eect (thus increasing the informational eciency). We also study the robustness of
the principal ndings to alternative specications concerning market participation, entry of new
agents, and the amount of liquidity that agents hold.
Keywords informational eciency  conrmatory bias  agent-based models  asset pricing
JEL codes: G14, D82, D84.
1 Introduction
The power of competitive markets as ecient aggregators of the decentralized information that
dierent economic agents possess is one of the fundamental problems in economic theory. Hayek
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(1945) rst formulated the hypothesis of informational eciency of competitive markets. Further
research analyzed this hypothesis in the case of centralized (Grossman, 1976; Wilson, 1977;
Milgrom, 1981) and decentralized markets (Wolinsky, 1990; Blouin and Serrano, 2001; Due
and Manso, 2007).
Virtually all contributions in this research area assume that economic agents are fully rational.
However, recent literature in experimental nancial markets (e.g. Haruvy et al., 2007) nds that
the traders price expectations deviate strongly from the rational-expectations assumption. Thus,
while the research cited above constitutes a useful benchmark, having a more complete knowledge
about the informational eciency of markets requires relaxing the assumption of rationality of
price expectations.
In this and the companion paper (Aldashev et al. 2010) we study the performance (as an
ecient information aggregator) of a competitive market in which agents expectation formation
about future price of the traded asset can have two kinds of deviations from full rationality. First,
traders have adaptive expectations, i.e. they give more importance to the past realized price of
the asset than the fully rational agent would. Second, the agents are subject to the so-called
conrmatory (or conrmation) bias: they tend to discard the new information that substantially
diers from their priors.
The common sense intuition indicates that a systematic deviation from rationality (among
all agents) hurts the eciency of a competitive market, because such systematic deviations from
rationality in expectation formation map, via biased trading actions of agents, into equilibrium
prices that do not correctly reect the fundamental value of the traded asset. Moreover, a larger
extent of such deviation should imply less market eciency. However, we nd a surprising result
that while, taken separately, each of the deviations from rationality worsens the informational
eciency of the market, for some ranges of parameters, when the two biases are combined, they
tend to mitigate each others eect (thus increasing the informational eciency).
With respect to the results found in Aldashev et al. (2010), in this paper we study the
robustness of the principal ndings to alternative specications of the model concerning market
participation (all agents versus only the agents that revise their expectations), entry of new agents
(replacement by agents with the same initial price expectation versus ones with a randomly drawn
initial expectations), and the amount of liquidity that agents hold (nite, i.e. some exit occurs,
versus innite, i.e. no exit).
2 The baseline model
In Aldashev et al. (2010) authors presented a simplied model aimed to unravel some of the price
formation mechanisms in a market where agents incorporate private information from peers and
public information. In the present work we analyze and discuss some of the working assumptions
made in Aldashev et al. (2010) and we propose some new research directions. For the sake of
completeness we hereby recall the main characteristics of the above mentioned model, addressing
the interested reader to Aldashev et al. (2010).
Let us thus consider a market, where time evolves by discrete steps (hereby denoted by integer
values t = 0; 1; : : : ) to mimic the opening and closure of the real market periods, and that is
composed by N participants - agents - each one endowed with an initial liquidity L0 > 0. During
each period, agents can trade the single asset of this market at a price (normalized to belong to
the interval [0; 1]) that will be denoted by Pt in period t. This price, which is public information,
is initially xed to some level P0 that can dier from the fundamental value of the asset, in this
way we want to simulate the post IPO (Initial Public Oering) phase of the market dynamics.
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Every agent i can place an order to buy or short sell 1 unit of the asset, on the basis of her
expectation about the price for period t, hereby denoted by P e;it . We assume that initially on
average, agents have unbiased information about its fundamental value (more specically the
initial price expectations of the agents is drawn from a uniform distribution in the [0; 1] interval
and therefore the fundamental value of the asset is actually 12 ).
The process of formation of the expectations for the next period is the main novelty of the
model with respect to previous literature, being signicantly dierent from the standard rational-
expectation benchmark. This assumption constitutes thus the main theoretical contribution of
both papers since it allows to model the deviations from rationality observed in the empirical
literature in a relatively simple and distributed way.
More precisely, we introduce two biases in the agents expectation formation. First, agents are
allowed to inuence each others through social interactions with conrmatory bias, i.e. agents
exchange information about prices, but they tend to disregard price information that diers to
much from their own. Second, agents give a non-zero weight to the, publicly known, past market
prices. The degrees to which these two biases are present in the process of decision making of
the agent are dened by the parameter , responsible for the degree of mind openness, and  for
the degree of adaptiveness.
Finally, each agent weights both contributions to get her next period expectation, more
precisely, if agent i interacts with agent j then:
P e;it+1 = Pt + (1  )
8<:P
e;i
t if
P e;it   P e;jt   
P e;it +P
e;j
t
2 otherwise
; (1)
During each period, only a fraction  2 (0; 1] of the N agents, is able to update their price
expectation, while the remaining one keep their own previous expectations.
Once the agent has got her price expectation, she decides to participate or not to the market,
and if to be a buyer or a seller. Considering that placing an order implies a small xed but
positive transaction cost c, agent i will participate to the market according to its expected next-
period gain, i.e. if
P e;it+1   Pt  c > 0. She will participate on the buyer side if P e;it+1 > Pt or on
the seller side if P e;it+1 < Pt. At the end of the period, each agent learns the price Pt at which the
trade has been settled, and the prots/loss she realizes.
The market mechanism, which sets the price, Pt, at each period, is similar to the Walrasian
auctioneer, hence the market is centralized. More precisely we assume that :
1. The hypothetical price P t+1, solution of the equation nB(x) = nS(x), i.e. the price that,
almost, equates the number of buyers and sellers at price x, is calculated. Whenever there
are several solutions to this equation, P t+1 will denote their average;
2. In order to take into account possible disequilibrium in the market (excess of demand or
supply) we introduce a correction to this hypothetical price. The market price Pt+1 will move
in the direction to eliminate excess of demand or supply, i.e.:
Pt+1 = (Pt)P

t+1 + (1  (Pt))Pt : (2)
Let us observe that the disequilibrium will not disappear instantly: indeed in Eq. 2 the speed
of price adjustment depends on the size of the excess demand or excess supply relative to the
size of the population, i.e. (x) = jnB(x)  nS(x)j =N1;
1 We avoid the shortcoming of assuming a constant (Pt). As discussed by LeBaron (2001), if (Pt) is assumed
to be constant, the behavior of the simulated market is extremely sensitive to the value of , which makes it
dicult to interpret the results.
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Once the price has been set, each agent participating in the market, places an order, then
the number of exchanges that occurs is minfnB(Pt); nS(Pt)g. Finally each seller i updates her
liquidity by Lit+1 = L
i
t + Pt   c while each buyer by Ljt+1 = Ljt   Pt   c. If, as a result of
this procedure, agent's liquidity dries up to zero, then that agent leaves the market and she is
substituted by another agent with with liquidity L0, and with same next-period price expectation
that she initially had.
In Aldashev et al. (2010) authors analyzed in details the model, with particular attention
to the market ineciency, namely the long-run deviation of Pt from the fundamental value, as
function of the key parameters: ,  and . In the present paper, we propose some interesting
extensions to the original model, with the aim of testing the robustness of the results and still
answering to the questions: Does the market price Pt converge to the fundamental value of the
asset? If not, how large is the market ineciency, namely the long-run deviation of Pt from the
fundamental value?
Moreover, we are interested in understanding :
{ What happen to the market ineciency, and to other key variables, when only agents, allowed
to update their expectations, do participate to the market ?
{ How the market ineciency does depend on the new agents insertion? More precisely, how
the previous results of Aldashev et al. (2010) are modied, if, whenever an agent leaves the
market because her liquidity is negative, a new agent is introduced, whose price expectation
is randomly chosen and therefore uncorrelated with the previous one?
{ What happens when the main source of noise, namely the substitution of agents, is eliminated?
3 The Results
The non-linearity of the interaction between agents in presence of multiple biases makes compre-
hensive analytical results beyond reach, in particular when market participants are both adaptive
( > 0) and socially interacting ( > 0). The interested reader can nd a detailed analytical
treatment of the cases where agents assume extreme behaviors, i.e.   0,   1,   0 and
  1, in Aldashev et al. (2010). Thus main analysis' tool will hereby constituted by numerical
simulations. The cost of a trading transaction is throughout xed to c = 0:005. We let each
simulation, to run until the market price converged to an almost steady state, namely when the
dierence between the market prices in periods t and t+ 1 is smaller than the threshold 10 6.
When otherwise specied, each agent receives initially a relatively low liquidity, L0 = 10, in
such a way there is the possibility that the strategy of an agent will lead to exhaustion of her
liquidity. Finally, to obtain some statistics, for each pair of values (; ) the market simulation
is repeated 10 times.
All the relevant variables have been studied as a function of the weight of the adaptive
component in the price expectations of traders  and of the degree of conrmatory bias 1   .
Figure 1 reports the informational ineciency of the market for the cases in which the fraction of
agents that revise their expectations in every period is  = 0:2, 0:5 and 1, respectively (Panels A,
B, and C where not otherwise stated). Lighter colors indicate lower level of market ineciency,
while darker ones indicate higher ineciency. Figure 2 shows the average number of traders that
exit the market as their liquidity hits the zero boundary. Figure 3 shows the standard deviation
of price expectations of the agents when the market price reaches the steady state. Finally Figure
4 shows, for the case of  = 0:2, the average liquidity owned by the agents at the end of the
simulation (Panel A) together with the time needed to stabilize the market (Panel B) and the
number of trades realized in the nal period of the simulation (Panel C). .
From the analysis of the results reported in these Figures it follows the following proposition:
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Fig. 1 Market ineciency as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias (1  ). Panel
A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0. Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial liquidity L0 = 10,
newcoming agents have the same initial price expectation of the leaving ones.
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL A
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL B
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL C
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 2 Average rate of exiting agents as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias
(1   ). Panel A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0. Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial
liquidity L0 = 10, newcoming agents have the same initial price expectation of the leaving ones.
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Fig. 3 Panel A: Standard deviation of price expectation at convergence as a function of the adaptive component
() and the conrmatory bias (1 ). Panel B: distribution of the price expectations at steady state for  = 0:01
and 1    = 0:9. Panel C: distribution of the price expectations at steady state for  = 0:01 and 1    = 0:5.
Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial liquidity L0 = 10,  = 0:2, newcoming agents have the same initial
price expectation of the leaving ones.
Proposition 1 1. The market ineciency can be non-monotonic in (), adaptive component
weight, and this trend is stronger, the lower is the fraction of agents that revise their price
expectations in each period, i.e. small ;
2. The slope of the relationship of market ineciency in the degree of conrmatory bias () can
be of opposite sign at dierent values of the weight of the adaptive component ().
3. Market ineciency can be non-monotonic in the degree of conrmatory bias (1  );
4. The value of  at which the non-monotonicity of the market ineciency with respect to the
conrmatory bias, appears gets smaller as  increases;
5. The average liquidity is larger for parameters values giving rise to higher-than-expected inef-
ciency.
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Fig. 4 Average liquidity (Panel A) at convergence, time of convergence (Panel B) and number of exchanges at
steady state (Panel C) as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias (1   ).  = 0:2.
Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial liquidity L0 = 10, newcoming agents have the same initial price
expectation of the leaving ones.
Since the results of Prop. 1.1 to 1.4 are widely analyzed in Aldashev et al. (2010) only a brief
summary of the discussion on them is proposed here before proceeding with the dissertation of
our new results.
The non-monotonicity with respect to  (see Prop. 1) can be observed by xing the value
of 1   , and moving horizontally from the left point corresponding to  = 0, to the right
 = 1 in Figure 1. The market ineciency rst decreases and then increases - at least for some
values of . Let us observe that, for large values of  the market ineciency is strong, this can
be explained by the fact that traders give very high weight to past prices when forming their
expectations, so the initial price becomes very important. When receiving information which
indicates that the value of the asset is low (whichever is the level of conrmatory bias), traders
tend to disregard it - all that matters is the past price. This imply that initial price strongly
inuences the aggregate expectation formation process. As  declines (assuming no eective social
interaction, i.e. 1   1), the traders give less weight to the past prices and more weight to their
expectations of the previous period. There are here two inter-related processes in action namely
the upward drift of price expectations of initially low-expectation agents and the downward
pressure on the market price converge, their combination lead the market price to converge not
very far from the fundamental value. But when  value declines even more, market ineciency
rises again since the rst process (upward move in expectations of the initially low-expectation
agents) gets much slower that the second one (downward move in the market price). This leads
low-expectation agents to adopt a strategy resulting in persistent negative prots, and eventually
to exit the market (notice that in Figure 2 the rise in the number of agents that exit the market
increases at the top-left part of the gure). This substitution of agents is sucient to soften
the downward move in the market price, resulting in higher-than-expected market ineciency.
Weakening the conrmatory bias (i.e. increasing the value of ) the channel that leads to the
exit of low expectation traders softens down, as there is now an additional mechanism that
creates an upward pressure on the expectations of those traders: the integration of information
that comes from their peers. However also the relationship between market ineciency and
conrmatory bias is non-monotone. As we move from the point at the bottom ( = 0) upwards,
the average deviation of the long-run market price from the fundamental value rst decreases and
then increases, this behaviors, summarized in Prop. 1.3 can be explained as follow: as a trader
becomes more open minded, she starts to integrate at least some of the information about the
fundamentals contained in the price expectations of another trader leading to lower ineciency
in the market, but when the agents becomes very open-minded (and the weight of history is not
too small), this openness induce them to 'excessively' integrate the early upward drift into the
expectations, leading to higher ineciency. Furthermore, comparing across dierent levels of 
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it is possible to retrieve the result of Prop. 1.4: as the fraction of agents that can update their
expectations in each period () increases, the area of non-monotonicity becomes smaller. This
happens because the possibility to exchange information (higher ) and the eective willingness
to integrate the information coming from other traders (higher ) act in a complementary fashion:
if the possibilities to exchange information are limited, the openness of mind do not soften down
the exit channel signicantly. Only when the possibilities to exchange are large that the openness
of mind starts to have a real bite, and the upward-sloping part on the left side of the relation
between market ineciency and alpha starts to disappear.
The area on in which the market ineciency is higher than expected presents also an higher
average level of liquidity per agent at the steady state meaning that, on average, the agents grow
richer during the simulation (see Figure 4, panel A). This is the result of the combination of
two eects. On the one side the time required by the market price to reach the steady state is
higher (see panel B of Figure 4) when agents have low  and high (1 ) since the agents update
their expectations relatively slow. On the other side due to the large degree of conrmatory bias
many interactions are rejected. This implies that agent with low initial expectation move upward
slowly and, persistently underestimating the market price, eectively distribute their liquidity to
the agents that where initialized nearer to the initial price. After some time this strategy dries
up their liquidity and they are excluded from the market. However, these agents are substituted
by other with the same initial price expectations (P e;i0 substitution) so the more time it takes
to achieve equilibrium, the more the agents initially near to the market price get richer. This
eect disappears when the agents give more weight to history (since the expectations of all the
agents move too fast also causing a bigger ineciency), or when the degree of conrmatory bias
(1  ) is lower (the expectations move in the direction of the market prices but, provided that
the agents do not give much weight to history, the ineciency is reduced by the mean preserving
nature of social interaction as modeled here). This phenomenon is observed in all variations of
this original model presented in this paper2 and it is summarized in Prop. 1.5.
It is clear, from the above discussions, that the noise introduced by the exiting agents is a
powerful mechanism, that alone explains a large part of the non-linear behavior of the model. To
support this claim we report in Figure 5, the results of simulation with  = 0:2 and the initial
liquidity arbitrarily large (L0 =1), in this way we prevent agent from reaching the zero-liquidity
boundary and thus to leave the market. We can observe that market ineciency (in panel A)
is almost perfectly monotonic, growing with  and, to a lesser measure, with (1  ). The non-
linear eects giving rise to non monotone behaviors disappeared. The standard deviation of the
expectations (Figure 5, Panel B) still increases in the area in which there was non monotonicity.
This happens because the social dynamics, as described below, still divide the agents in multiple
clusters of opinions. This division in groups means that some group of agents will subsidize the
others but, since agents are innitely rich, this do not have consequences on the market eciency
(no agent is ever substituted). Let us notice nally that the elimination of the noise given by the
substitution of the agents do not have any signicant eect on the time of convergence of the
model (see Figure 5, Panel C in comparison with Figure 4, Panel B).
Let us now briey comment on the used hypotheses. The rst concerns the expectations of
the newcoming agents introduced when some of the old leaves because its liquidity has reached
negative values. Up to now, we assumed that the new agent has the same initial expectation of the
exiting agent, namely they are strongly correlated. While this can be a reasonable assumption,
for instance when the traders comes from the same company (or the same household), one cannot
always assume such perfect correlation, we thus relax this assumption by allowing new entrants
2 Data for not reported results are available upon request to the authors.
8 Simone Righi et al.
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL A
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL B
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL C
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Fig. 5 Market ineciency (Panel A), standard deviation of the price expectations at steady state (Panel B) and
time of convergence (Panel C) as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias (1   ).
 = 0:2. The initial price is P0 = 0:9 and initial liquidity arbitrarily large L0 =1.
to have initial expectations uniformly randomly distributed, hence completely uncorrelated with
that of exiting agents (for short random substitution in the following).
The second assumption is about the agents' expectation update and the possibility to trade in
the market. Up to now, we assumed that a fraction  of agent is able to update their expectations
but everybody participate to the market. While it is clearly possible that someone trade without
new information, it is more realistic to assume that only people able to gather new information
will take the risk of buying and selling stocks, and therefore will contribute to the formation of
the market price.
3.1 Uncorrelated substitution of failed agents
The aim of this section is to study the market ineciency under the hypothesis of random
substitution, results are reported in Figures 6 to 9.
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Fig. 6 Market ineciency as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias (1  ). Panel
A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0. Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial liquidity L0 = 10,
newcoming agents have the uncorrelated initial price expectation with respect to the leaving ones.
Under this assumption, some of the previous results are conrmed: there is still non mono-
tonicity with respect to weight of the adaptive component , a behaviors that is even more
marked in this case, and the area of non-monotonicity still becomes smaller as the proportion of
agents that update their expectations increases. However, the market ineciency as a function
of the degree of conrmatory bias is now monotone. Hence summing up:
Proposition 2 When there is no correlation in the expectations of the agent exiting and entering
the market:
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Fig. 7 Average rate of exiting agents as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias
(1  ). Panel A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0. Parameters are : initial price P0 = 0:9, initial
liquidity L0 = 10, newcoming agents have the uncorrelated initial price expectation with respect to the leaving
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Fig. 8 Panel A: standard deviation of price expectation at convergence as a function of the adaptive component
() and the conrmatory bias (1   ). Panel B: distribution of the price expectations at the steady state for
 = 0:01 and 1   = 0:9. In both panels  = 0:2. Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial liquidity L0 = 10,
newcoming agents have the uncorrelated initial price expectation with respect to the leaving ones.
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL A
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
weight of adaptive component (α)
co
n
fir
m
at
or
y 
bi
as
 (1
−σ
)
PANEL B
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
50
100
150
200
Fig. 9 Average time of convergence (Panel A) and number of trades at the steady state (Panel B) as a function
of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias (1  ).  = 0:2. Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9,
initial liquidity L0 = 10, newcoming agents have the uncorrelated initial price expectation with respect to the
leaving ones.
1. Results of Propositions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.5 are conrmed
2. Market ineciency is monotone in the degree of conrmatory bias (1  ), therefore Propo-
sitions 1.3 and 1.4 do not hold.
3. The market price reaches the steady state while trade opportunities still exists.
In Proposition 1.3 the non-monotonicity was emerging as a result of the 'over-integration' of
the initial upward drift from the agents. The mechanism of random substitution implies that the
agents with initial low expectation are much more likely to exit the market than those with high
initial expectations and therefore, in the long run, there will be proportionally more of the latter
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than of the former, the market price will therefore stabilize around a value farther away from
the fundamental value than in the P e;i0 substitution case. Interestingly the random substitution
induces a sort of natural selection of the agents, selecting those who begin nearer to the IPO
price of the asset. Moreover, as for every evolutionary mechanism in a stable environment, the
longer is the simulation the stronger will be its eect.
Figures 9 (Panel B) and 4 (Panel C), shows the average number of trades actions in the period
in which the model reach the steady state. In the areas characterized by non monotonicity there
is still activity on the market (as summarized in proposition 2.3). The reason for which the price
stabilizes while there is still trade is the following: in this area agents are, almost purely, social
agents, that give very little importance to historical price, and that interact through the bounded
condence mechanism that has been described. It has been shown by Weisbuch et al. (2002) that
in an opinion dynamics as this one, the number of cluster formed by the agents in the long
run varies as the integer part of 12 . This means that agents will tend to form multiple clusters
when  is small. Inside each cluster there is consensus on the market price, while persistent
dierence will remain among agents belonging to dierent clusters. The substitution mechanism
employed is not neutral to the strength of this phenomena. If 'P e;i0 substitution' mechanism
is used then, since the agents don't move far from their original ideas about the price before
eventually exit the market the new agents substituting them will not have initial expectations
signicantly dierent from the one of those who just exit and will therefore end up in the same
cluster as them (as can be seen from Figure 3, Panel B) At the opposite with the 'Random
substitution' the division in clusters will tend to disappear as a result of the evolutive selection
that characterize this mechanism (see Figure 8 Panel B). Finally let us notice that the division
in cluster also disappears when the degree of conrmatory bias is reduced (see Figure 3, Panel
C)
3.2 Only active agents can trade
Due to the technological level of the exchange procedures employed in modern markets, everyone
can set an order, thus we can suppose that also agents, unable for some practical reasons to
get informed, can participate to the trade. Practically, anyway, this is not very realistic: no
trader would decide to buy or sell assets without having acquired (or at least tried given time
constraints that he has) as much information as possible on the asset is going to trade. Thus
more realistically we assume that only those agents i that have the opportunity to update their
expectation, a fraction  of the total, do participate in the market and therefore contribute to
the formation of the market price.
Figure 10, that reports the market ineciency, clearly shows that some points of the Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 still holds, while some others have to be rejected. It follows this proposition:
Proposition 3 When only active agents participate to the process of formation of the market
price:
1. Propositions 1.1 (rst part), 1.2,1.3 and 1.5 hold.
2. The tendency of the market ineciency to be non-monotonic in  is stronger, the higher is
the fraction of agents that revise their price expectations in each period.
3. The weight of the adaptive component in the expectations () at which the non-monotonicity
of the market ineciency in the degree of conrmatory bias appears remains unchanged when
the fraction of agents that revise their expectations increases.
4. Levels of market ineciency are higher that in the case of Proposition 1.
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Fig. 10 Market ineciency as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias (1 ). Panel
A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0.Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial liquidity L0 = 10,
newcoming agents have the same initial price expectation of the leaving ones; only active agents contribute to the
formation of the market price.
The dierence between Prop 1.1 (second part) and Prop. 3.2 is the most important one. The
relationship between , the fraction of agents allowed to update their expectations each step, and
the strength of the non-linearities in  and  is reversed. While for  = 0:2 is almost invisible,
increasing the value of this parameter the area becomes more well dened. This depends on the
sensibility of the market price to the expectations of the agents, that inuence it. When  is small
only a few, randomly selected, agents trade and therefore the market price will be more sensible
to their choices. To understand why the non-monotonicity in the top-left part of Figure 10 (Panel
A), almost disappears, remember that the population of the agent begin the simulation uniformly
distributed. A random selection on such a sample will therefore tend to select agents from 0 to
1 more or less uniformly; when this is associated with the slow movement of expectations that
characterize the area of non-monotonicity (low weight of history and high conrmatory bias)
the consequence is that the price of the asset moves rapidly near the its fundamental value.
Consistently, Figure 11 shows that more agents leave the market when  is increased.
At the opposite the weight of the adaptive component in the expectations () at which the
non-monotonicity of the market ineciency in the degree of conrmatory bias appears remains
unchanged regardless to . To understand why this happen remember that the non-monotonicity
in the degree of conrmatory bias appears, in the baseline model, when the upward drift of the
expectations of the low-expectation agents becomes too slow with respect to the downward
movement of the market price and that both these mechanisms are inuenced by the proportion
of active agents each step (). In the present case, at the contrary, the market price become
more sensible when  is low but this do not inuence signicantly the movement of expectations
(which depends only on  and , both small in the area interested by the phenomenon), the two
eects actually completely oset each other leading to the result of Prop 3.3.
Observing Figure 10, in comparison with Figure 1, it is clear that while the baseline model
presents values higher than 0.16 (to which we have rescaled all the images in order to make them
comparable) only for high values of  now, with the exception of the area of non monotonicity,
the levels of ineciency (given some ,  and ) are generally higher. The reason for this is that
when more agents participate to a market there is an higher volume of potential trade, which
in turns leads to more eciency. Consistently comparing the Figure 2 and Figure 11 we can see
that there are more agents exiting the market (proportionally to the level of ) in the rst gure
than in the second, because we now have less interactions and therefore less agents dry up their
liquidity even in a larger number of steps.
Finally, looking at Figures 9 (Panel A) and Figure 12: when  is small the simulations where
all the agent participate to the market price formation process takes much more time to converge
that the case in which only active people interact. The sensibility of the market price is once again
12 Simone Righi et al.
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Fig. 11 Average rate of exiting agents as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias
(1   ). Panel A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0. Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial
liquidity L0 = 10, newcoming agents have the same initial price expectation of the leaving ones; only active agents
contribute to the formation of the market price. The data have been normalized in order to control for the fact
that more people participate to the market each turn (caeteris paribus) when  is bigger.
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Fig. 12 Average time of convergence as a function of the adaptive component () and the conrmatory bias
(1   ). Panel A:  = 0:2, Panel B:  = 0:5 and Panel C:  = 1:0.Parameters are: initial price P0 = 0:9, initial
liquidity L0 = 10, newcoming agents have the same initial price expectation of the leaving ones; only active agents
contribute to the formation of the market price.
the main determinant of this behaviour. The market price is more sensible to the expectations
of the active agents if they are the only to participate in the formation of the market price. The
higher volatility of the prices implies shorter times of convergence associated with the higher
levels of ineciency already discussed.
4 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the informational eciency of a nancial market in which the ex-
pectation formation process of traders has two kinds of deviations from rationality (adaptive
expectations and conrmatory bias). Taken separately, each deviation worsens the informational
eciency of the market; however, for some ranges of parameters, when the two biases are com-
bined, they tend to mitigate each others eect (thus increasing the informational eciency).
We have studied the robustness of the principal ndings to alternative specications concern-
ing market participation, entry of new agents, and the amount of liquidity that agents hold. In
particular, in order to test the pervasiveness of the role of the substitution mechanism we studied
the case in which the initial expectation of the newcomers, about the real price of the asset, is
a random value. We found that, while most of the predictions obtained in the previous case
are conrmed, the non-monotonicity in the degree of conrmatory bias disappears due to the
emergence of a selective process that favour the agents initially near the market price. In order to
complete our analysis we then modied the model allowing only the price expectations of those
agents that try to update their information to participate to the mechanism of formation of the
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public market price. We discovered that, while all the non-monotonic behaviors observed in the
baseline model persists, we have a reversal in the eect caused, on the market ineciency, by the
degree of participation in the market. The area in which the informational ineciency is higher
than what it would be expected if we had a monotonic behavior gets larger as the proportion of
agents updating their expectations increases.
Our ndings integrate those obtained in Aldashev et al. (2010) signicantly extending the
understanding of the consequences that the key assumptions of the model have on them. The
well-known result that allocative eciency can be obtained also in presence of signicantly de-
viations from the perfect rationality (Gode and Sunder, 1993,1997) is here extended also to the
informational eciency. Indeed we show that multiple deviations from rationality, under some
assumptions and if present in the right mixes, can increase the informational eciency of a
market. This happens when the eect caused by the dierent biases tend to cancel each other
out.
The main limitations of our analysis are twofold. First, agents are homogeneous in all aspects
except the initial expectations about the market price. Second, the parameters of their degree
of conrmatory bias are xed. Further analyses should verify the robustness of our ndings to
relaxing these two assumptions. Another interesting direction for future work is experimental
analysis of market price dynamics that would use our model as the blueprint. To the best of
our knowledge, the existing experimental literature does not consider the possibility that traders
inuence each others expectations through social interactions (despite the informal evidence that
this plays a key role; see Shiller, 1984). Studying the eect of such interactions on market behavior
(in particular, informational eciency) in the lab is a promising line for future research.
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